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I. INTRODUCTION
As government agencies and businesses rely more heavily on
computer technology, the opportunities increase for cybercriminals to do harm. The ever increasing cyber-crime problem
begins with the fact that a person “with a standard desktop PC can
1
potentially pose a real threat to [computer] systems . . . .”
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, in 2000, 51% of
American households had computers and 41.5% of American
2
households had Internet access. Globally, about 304 million
3
people have access to the Internet. These Internet consumers
4
shop, search for jobs, and gather information online. In fact, in
† Minnesota State University Moorhead, B.S. International Business, B.A.
Spanish, magna cum laude, 2001; William Mitchell College of Law, J.D. anticipated
2004.
1. Electronic Frontier Foundation, RSA Code-Breaking Contest Again Won by
Distributed.Net and Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), Jan. 19, 1999, at
http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Crypto_misc/DESCracker/HTML/19990119_deschal
lenge3.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2002).
2. ERIC C. NEWBURGER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOME COMPUTERS AND
INTERNET USE IN THE UNITED STATES: AUGUST 2000 1 (2001), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/p23-207.pdf (last visited Aug. 26, 2002).
Fifty-four million households have a computer while forty-four million households
have Internet access. Id. at 1-2.
3. U.S. DEP’ T OF COMMERCE, DIGITAL ECONOMY 2000 7 (June 2000), available
at http://www.esa.doc.gov/de2000.pdf (Sept. 2001).
4. Id. at 8.
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the fourth quarter of 1999, the Census Bureau found that online
5
retail sales totaled $5.3 billion.
More striking, an Industry Standard estimate forecasts the value
of electronic transactions between businesses to range from $634
6
billion to $2.8 trillion in 2003. A Purchase Magazine survey found
that 38% of companies use the Internet to conduct some of their
7
business transactions.
The survey also found that 35% of
companies that did not do business over the Internet planned to
start by 2000, and 54% of the companies that did not do business
8
over the Internet planned to start by 2002.
With so many people using the Internet and with the
consistent growth of Internet business transactions, it is not
surprising that the government would take strong measures to
protect the Internet and other electronic forms of communication
9
from intruders who damage computer systems. These intruders
10
11
are called “crackers” (not to be confused with “hackers” ) and
5. Id. at 9. The survey included only business-to-consumer goods retailers
and left out business-to-consumer sales of services (travel, entertainment, or stock
transactions). Id. at 9 n.5.
6. Id. at 15. See Stacy Lawrence, Behind the Numbers: The Mystery of B2B
Forecasts Revealed, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD, Feb. 21, 2000, available at
http://www.thestandard.com/article/0,1902,11300,00.html (June 2000).
7. U.S. DEP’ T OF COMMERCE, supra note 3, at 16.
8. Id.
9. Thomas R. McCarthy, Don’t Fear Carnivore: It Won’t Devour Individual
Privacy, 66 M O. L. REV 827, 831 (2001).
If law enforcement is too timid in responding to cybercrime . . . we will,
in effect, render cyberspace a safe haven for criminals and terrorists to
communicate and carry out crime, without fear of authorized
government surveillance. If we fail to make the Internet safe, people’s
confidence in using the Internet and e-commerce will decline,
endangering the very benefits brought by the Information Age. Proper
balance is key.
Id.
10. See SearchSecurity.com Definitions, at
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid14_gci211852,00.html
(last visited Aug. 29, 2002). It defines “cracker” as:
[S]omeone who breaks into someone else’s computer system, often on
a network; bypasses passwords or licenses in computer programs; or in
other ways intentionally breaches computer security. A cracker can be
doing this for profit, maliciously, for some altruistic purpose or cause,
or because the challenge is there. Some breaking-and-entering has
been done ostensibly to point out weaknesses in a site’s security system.
The term ‘cracker’ is not to be confused with ‘hacker.’ Hackers
generally deplore cracking.
Id.
11. See SearchSecurity.com Definitions, at
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they are becoming more of a problem with the increasing use of
computers.
For example, after the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (“NATO”) jets hit the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade
in May of 1999, crackers from China attacked a handful of U.S.
12
government sites.
In an unrelated incident, the U.S. Justice
Department’s website was shut down because crackers put Nazi
13
swastikas on its homepage. Crackers have also damaged the CIA’s
website by changing the name from “Central Intelligence Agency”
14
to “Central Stupidity Agency.”
These acts seem harmless enough and most “break-ins are
15
done purely as sport . . . .” A problem arises, however, when
crackers break into systems for “greed, or for foreign powers, or for
16
one industry against another, or for organized crime.” It is
estimated that Internet crime takes about $1.6 trillion out of the
17
global economy. This is due to such things as website downtime,
website repair, the cost of training computer crime trackers, and
18
lost business.
In the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
Act of 2001 (“USA PATRIOT Act”), Congress attempted to give
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid14_gci212220,00.html
(last visited Oct. 26, 2002). It defines “hacker” as “a clever programmer.”
[F]ive possible characteristics qualify one as a hacker: (1) [a] person
who enjoys learning details of a programming language or system; (2)
[a] person who enjoys actually doing the programming rather than just
theorizing about it; (3) [a] person capable of appreciating someone
else’s hacking; (4) [a] person who picks up programming quickly; and
(5) [a] person who is an expert at a particular programming language
or system.
Id.
12. The Associated Press and Reuters, Feds Warn Hackers will be Prosecuted; ProMitnick Protest Planned, available at
http://www.cnn.com/TECH/computing/9906/02/hunting.hackers (June 2,
1999).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. San Francisco Examiner, FBI Uses Computers to Catch High-Tech Crooks, The
News and Observer Publishing Co. 1995, available at
http://www.indy.net/~sabronet/news/fbihack.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2002).
16. Id.
17. Reuters, FBI Plan: Cybercrime Info Sharing, at http://cert.unistuttgart.de/archive/isn/2001/01/msg00024.html (Jan. 5, 2001).
18. See Heather Eikenberry, Hacker’s Insurance: When All Else Fails, SANS INST.
INFO. READING ROOM, at http://rr.sans.org/casestudies/insurance.php (Jan. 9,
2001). In 2000, Computer Security Institute (CSI) reported an increase in
computer crime. Id.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2003

3

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2003], Art. 3
S CHEMMEL ARTICLE CURRENT FORMATTED.DOC

924

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

2/7/2003 2:33 PM

[Vol. 29:3

government agencies the leeway they need to track down cyber19
criminals. This Comment explores the history of computer-use
legislation and documents the relevant sections of the USA
PATRIOT Act that amend sections of the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act and sections of the Electronic Communications Privacy
20
Act. Next, the Comment analyzes the effects of such legislation
21
on computer users and law enforcement agencies. The Comment
concludes that the legislation is a necessary evil in the quest to
22
track down and punish cyber-criminals.
II. COMPUTER-USE LEGISLATION
In the past two decades, Congress has passed a number of acts
23
that regulate computer use and privacy. This Comment addresses
only a few of the statutes that have been amended by the USA
24
PATRIOT Act. A discussion of certain sections of the Computer
19. The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) [hereinafter “USA PATRIOT Act”].
20. See infra Part II.
21. Id.
22. See infra Part III. This Comment does not address civil liberties issues.
For articles critical of the USA PATRIOT Act on civil liberty grounds see Jennifer
C. Evans, Comment, Hijacking Civil Liberties: The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, 33 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 933, 974-82 (2002); Steven A. Osher, Privacy, Computers and the
PATRIOT Act: The Fourth Amendment Isn’t Dead, But No One Will Insure It, 54 FLA. L.
REV. 521, 525-26 (2002); Walter Shapiro, Usual Adversaries United Over Threat to
Liberties, USA TODAY, Sept. 26, 2001, at A6; Electronic Frontier Foundation, EFF
Analysis of the Provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act That Relate to Online Activities, at
http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/Terrorism_militias/20011031_eff_usa_p
atriot_analysis.html (Oct. 31, 2001); Karen G. Schneider, The Patriot Act: Last
Refuge of a Scoundrel, AMERICAN LIBRARIES, at
http:///www.ala.org/alonline/netlib/il302.html (Mar. 2002); but see Michael T.
McCarthy, USA PATRIOT Act, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 435, 451-52 (2002) (“In the
debate over the USA PATRIOT Act, one should not lose sight of the fact that the
law itself does not take away civil liberties, although some of its provisions permit
the executive branch to take actions that may do so.”).
23. For a comprehensive look at the statutory language of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, the Communications Act, the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, and the Computer Fraud & Abuse Act before and after the
enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act see Kay Pauley, Showing How Key Provisions of
the USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56) Amend Existing Law, at
http://www.cdt.org/security/USA PATRIOT Actpatriot/title1.pdf (Nov. 2001).
24. Statutes such as the Copyright Infringement Act, the No Electronic Theft
Act, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, the National Stolen Property Act, the
Communications Decency Act of 1996, the Child Online Protection Act of 1998,
and the Internet False Identification Act of 2000 will not be discussed. For a
discussion of such statutes and how they relate to computer crime, see Heather
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Fraud and Abuse Act and the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act in their pre-USA PATRIOT Act form follows. Subsequent to
those discussions is an assessment of how the USA PATRIOT Act
has changed each statute and an evaluation of the effects those
changes have on computer users and law enforcement agencies.
A. The USA PATRIOT Act
President George W. Bush signed the USA PATRIOT Act of
2001 into law on October 26, 2001, just six weeks after the attacks
25
of September 11, 2001. The PATRIOT Act originated in the
26
House of Representatives and the USA Act originated in the
27
Senate. On October 24, 2001, the House passed House Bill 3162,
28
which integrated House Bill 2975 and Senate Bill 1510. The
29
Senate also passed the bill and sent it to President Bush to sign.
The bill was hurried through Congress in hopes of preventing
30
future attacks.
Jacobson & Rebecca Green, Computer Crimes, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 273 (2002).
25. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). The Act
consists of ten provisions:
Title I—Enhancing Domestic Security Against Terrorism;
Title II—Enhanced Surveillance Procedures;
Title III—International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist
Financing Act of 2001;
Title IV—Protecting the Border;
Title V—Removing Obstacles to Investigating Terrorism;
Title VI—Providing for Victims of Terrorism, Public Safety Officers, and Their
Families;
Title VII—Increased Information Sharing for Critical Infrastructure Protection;
Title VIII—Strengthening the Criminal Laws Against Terrorism;
Title IX—Improved Intelligence; and
Title X—Miscellaneous.
Id.
26. CHARLES DOYLE, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, THE USA PATRIOT ACT: A
LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 (2002), available at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/10092.pdf (last visited Dec. 22,
2002) [hereinafter “CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS”]. Representative Sensenbrenner
for himself and Representatives Conyers, Hyde, Coble, Goodlatte, Jenkins,
Jackson-Lee, Cannon, Meehan, Graham, Bachus, Wexler, Hostettler, Keller, Issa,
Hart, Flake, Schiff, Thomas, Goss, Rangel, Berman, and Lofgren introduced the
PATRIOT Act in the House of Representatives as House Bill 2975. Id. at 1 n.2.
27. Id. Senator Daschle for himself and Senators Lott, Leahy, Hatch,
Graham, Shelby, and Sarbanes introduced the USA Act in the Senate as Senate
Bill 1510. Id. at 1 n.2.
28. Id. at 1.
29. Id. at 1-2.
30. See Homeland Defense: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th
Cong. (Sept. 25, 2001) (statement of Attorney General John Ashcroft) (“Everyday
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The primary stated purposes of the USA PATRIOT Act are to
“deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around
the world [and] to enhance law enforcement investigatory
31
tools . . . .” The USA PATRIOT Act fulfills its purposes mainly by
32
amending pre-existing statutes. Amendments to some statutes
33
produce an effect greater than catching terrorists. The amended
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and the amended Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, for example, give law enforcement
34
officials more latitude in catching domestic cyber-criminals.
In his testimony before the House Committee on the Judiciary,
Attorney General John Ashcroft commented on how the USA
PATRIOT Act would be designed to meet its purposes. He noted
that one deficiency in our current laws was that “technology has
35
dramatically outpaced our statutes.” He then stated, as the first
objective of the USA PATRIOT Act, “law enforcement needs a
that passes with outdated statutes and old rules of engagement is a day that
terrorists have a competitive advantage.”) available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/oldsite/te092501f.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2002).
31. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
32. See id.
33. In a hearing before the House Committee on the Judiciary, while
discussing whether the legislation should be limited to terrorists and not crimes in
general, Michael Chertoff, Assistant Attorney General in the Justice Department
for the Criminal Division, noted that:
[W]hen you commence a criminal investigation, it doesn’t come
labeled terrorist or nonterrorist. In fact, this provision, and a number
of the provisions really address inconsistencies in the law where under
one type of technology we are able to do one thing, but emerging
technology has created a gap in the law. There’s no change in the
privacy protection substantively. We’re just trying to even the playing
field.
Administration’s Draft Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001: Hearing Before the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 107th Cong. 26 (2001) (DoJ at § 108), available at
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/75288.pdf (last visited, Dec. 22, 2002)
[hereinafter “DoJ”]).
In the same hearing, while discussing whether computer crimes could rise to the
level of terrorism, Attorney General John Ashcroft stated:
[W]hen you think about the utilization of computers in terms of air
traffic control, you can imagine the chaos that could come from the
disruption of that system if we had an assault launched through a
computer virus or some other infection in the computer infrastructure,
whether it be power grids, power generation supplies and the like.
Id. at 18.
34. See infra Parts II.B-C.
35. United States Department of Justice, Attorney General John Ashcroft
Testimony Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/agcrisisremarks9_24.htm (Sept. 24, 2001).
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strengthened and streamlined ability for our intelligence-gathering
agencies to gather the information necessary to disrupt, weaken
36
and eliminate the infrastructure of terrorist organizations.”
Attorney General Ashcroft’s support for this objective is noted
throughout this Comment.
The USA PATRIOT Act amended the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act to work
more effectively with current technology. Both Acts provide
examples of how Attorney General Ashcroft’s objective will be met.
B. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
37

The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) was the first
law to address computer crime and is the main federal cyber-crime
38
statute. The CFAA addresses “computer crimes in which the
computer is the ‘subject’—that is, computer crimes for which there
is no analogous traditional crime and for which special legislation
39
40
41
is needed.” Such crimes include the use of “sniffers,” “worms,”
36. Id.
37. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1984). The 1984 Act was narrow, but as new computer
crime issues arose, Congress expanded the scope of the law by enacting the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986. See Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, § 2, 100 Stat. 1213 (1986) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §
1030 (2002)). See also Dodd S. Griffith, Note, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of
1986: A Measured Response to a Growing Problem, 43 VAND. L. REV. 453, 474 (1990)
(discussing the history of the 1984 Act and its 1986 amendments). Congress
expanded the Act’s scope again in 1988, 1989, 1990, 1994, and 1996. See AntiDrug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, Title VII, § 7065, 102 Stat. 4404
(1988) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2002)); Financial Institutions Reform
Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, Title IX, § 962(a)(5),
103 Stat. 502 (1989) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2002)); Crime Control
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 101-647, Title XII, § 1205(e), Title XXV, § 2597(j), Title
XXXV, § 3533, 104 Stat. 4831, 4910, 4925 (1990) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §
1030 (2002)); Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-322, Title XXIX, § 290001(b)-(f), 108 Stat. 2097-99 (1994) (current
version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2002)); Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-294, Title II, § 201, Title VI, § 604(b)(36), 110 Stat. 3491, 3508 (1996)
(current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2002), as amended by USA PATRIOT Act,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001)). See also Jo-Ann M. Adams, Comment,
Controlling Cyberspace: Applying the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to the Internet, 12
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 403, 424-25 (1996) (highlighting
changes made by the 1988, 1989, and 1990 amendments).
38. Bill Reilly, The Impact of the USA PATRIOT Act on Network Security Practices,
at http://packetstormsecurity.nl/papers/legal/patriot.doc (Nov. 15, 2001).
39. Jacobson & Green, supra note 24, at 279; see NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’ T OF JUSTICE, COMPUTER CRIME : CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESOURCE
M ANUAL 2 (1989).
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44

“Trojan horses,” “logic bombs,” and “viruses.” The CFAA has
been used to prosecute “malicious code authors, . . . ‘outside’
hackers who penetrate computers, steal information and/or cause
damage to the system, and people who use computers to commit
45
fraud.”
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 Pre-USA PATRIOT Act
The CFAA prohibits a person from knowingly accessing a
computer or exceeding authorization to gain information
concerning national defense, foreign relations, or any other
restricted data that could be used to injure the United States, or
46
that could be used to the advantage of any foreign nation. The
CFAA also makes it illegal for a person, without authorization, to
intentionally obtain information contained in the records of a
47
financial institution or consumer-reporting agency. An
unauthorized person cannot intentionally obtain information from
48
any department or agency of the United States or from any
protected computer if the conduct involves an interstate or foreign
49
communication.
The CFAA also makes it illegal to access a
nonpublic computer of any department or agency of the United

40. See SANS INSTITUTE RESOURCES,
AND INTRUSION DETECTION, at

NSA GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN SECURITY

http://www.sans.org/newlook/resources/glossary.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2002)
(defining “sniffer” as “[a] program to capture data across a computer network.
Used by hackers to capture user id names and passwords; [s]oftware tool that
audits and identifies network traffic packets. [It] is also used legitimately by
network operations and maintenance personnel to troubleshoot network
problems”).
41. See id. (defining “worm” as an “[i]ndependent program that replicates
from machine to machine across network connections often clogging networks
and information systems as it spreads”).
42. See id. (defining “Trojan horse” as “[a]n apparently useful and innocent
program containing additional hidden code which allows the unauthorized
collection, exploitation, falsification, or destruction of data”).
43. See id. (defining “logic bomb,” also known as “fork bomb,” as “[a] resident
computer program which, when executed, checks for a particular condition or
particular state of the system which, when satisfied, triggers the perpetration of an
unauthorized act”).
44. See id. (defining “virus” as “[a] program that can ‘infect’ other programs
by modifying them to include a, possibly evolved, copy of itself”).
45. See Reilly, supra note 38.
46. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1).
47. Id. at (a)(2)(A).
48. Id. at (a)(2)(B).
49. Id. at (a)(2)(C).
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States or any computer used by the United States government if
50
that conduct affects the government’s use.
Beyond minor
exceptions, a person cannot access a protected computer to further
51
an intended fraud.
The Act prohibits a person, with the intent to defraud, from
52
trafficking passwords that would affect interstate and foreign
53
commerce or permit access to a computer used by or for the
54
United States Government. Finally, a person cannot transmit
through interstate or foreign commerce a threat to damage a
55
protected computer in order to extort something of value.
2. 18 U.S.C § 1030 Post-USA PATRIOT Act
Section 814 of the USA PATRIOT Act amended and clarified
the CFAA in a number of significant ways. One notable change was
56
57
to subsection (a)(5), the computer “cracker” subsection. Before
the USA PATRIOT Act, subsection (a)(5) had three subsubsections: sub-subsection (A) prohibited a person from
intentionally accessing and intentionally causing damage to a
protected computer through the transmission of a program,
58
information, code, or command; sub-subsection (B) prohibited a
person from intentionally accessing and recklessly causing damage
59
through access of a protected computer; and sub-subsection (C)
prohibited a person from intentionally accessing and causing
60
damage to a protected computer.
The USA PATRIOT Act changed several original sub61
62
subsections and added new sub-subsections, (a)(5)(B)(i-v), that
50. Id. at (a)(3).
51. Id. at (a)(4).
52. To “traffic” is to “transfer or otherwise dispose of, to another, or obtain
control of with intent to transfer or dispose of.” 18 U.S.C. § 1029(e)(5).
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(6)(A).
54. Id. at (a)(6)(B).
55. Id. at (a)(7). The USA PATRIOT Act section 814(d)(5), 115 Stat. 272,
384 now defines “person” as “any individual, firm, corporation, educational
institution, financial institution, governmental entity, or legal or other entity.”
56. 18 U.S.C § 1030(a)(5), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 814(a), 115 Stat.
272, 382-83.
57. See SearchSecurity.com Definitions, supra note 10.
58. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A).
59. Id. at (a)(5)(B).
60. Id. at (a)(5)(C).
61. The USA PATRIOT Act changed original sub-subsections (a)(5)(A),
(a)(5)(B), and (a)(5)(C) to (a)(5)(A)(i), (a)(5)(A)(ii), and (a)(5)(A)(iii),
respectively.
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closely resemble what previously ware sub-subsections (e)(8)(A63
D). The new provisions prohibit the conduct of (a)(5)(A) where
the damage either: (i) caused the loss of at least $5000 to one or
64
more persons during any one-year period; (ii) modified or
impaired a medical examination, diagnosis, treatment, or care of
65
one or more individuals; (iii) caused physical injury to any
66
67
person; (iv) caused a threat to public health or safety; or (v)
caused damage to a computer system used by or for the
government in furtherance of the administration of justice,
68
national defense, or national security.
Sub-subsections (e)(8)(A)-(D) were part of the statute’s
definition of damages. By removing sub-subsections (A)-(D) and
moving them to sub-subsections (a)(5)(B)(i)-(v), the USA
69
PATRIOT Act has broadened the definition of “damages.” The
effect of the change “is to prohibit and punish crimes under this
section that cause minimal damage and to increase the punishment
70
for crimes causing significant damage.”
Before enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act, a person charged
with violating sub-subsection (a)(5) or sub-subsection (a)(7) could
71
have argued that damages did not exceed $5000 in one year. A
person charged with violating amended sub-subsection (a)(7) can
no longer make such an argument because there are no
72
specifications on the amount of damages that must be sustained.
However, the USA PATRIOT Act did not clarify how damages
would be calculated. A proper calculation is necessary because
62. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(B), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 814(a)(4),
115 Stat. 272, 383.
63. Id. at (e)(8)(A-D), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 814(d)(3), 115 Stat.
272, 384.
64. Id. at (a)(5)(B)(i), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 814(a)(4), 115 Stat.
272, 383.
65. Id. at (a)(5)(B)(ii), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 814(a)(4), 115 Stat.
272, 383.
66. Id. at (a)(5)(B)(iii), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 814(a)(4), 115 Stat.
272, 383.
67. Id. at (a)(5)(B)(iv), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 814(a)(4), 115 Stat.
272, 383.
68. Id. at (a)(5)(B)(v), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 814(a)(4), 115 Stat.
272, 383.
69. Id. at (e)(8), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 814(d)(3), 115 Stat. 272,
384 (defining “damages” as “any impairment to the integrity or availability of data,
a program, a system, or information”).
70. Jacobson & Green, supra note 24, at 283.
71. See id. at 285.
72. See supra note 69 (defining “damages”).
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according to sub-subsection (a)(5)(B)(i), the damage sustained
must value $5000 to one or more persons within a one-year
73
period.
The next notable addition to the CFAA is to the definition of
74
“protected computer.” A “protected computer” is a computer
that is used exclusively by a financial institution or by the United
75
States government or one that is used in interstate or foreign
76
commerce or communications. The USA PATRIOT Act added to
the definition of “protected computers” any “computer located
outside the United States that is used in a manner that affects
interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United
77
States.”
By extending the definition of “damages” and “protected
computer,” Congress has effectively given the United States Secret
Service and other governmental agencies greater jurisdiction to
78
investigate computer crimes. Sub-subsections (a)(4), (a)(5), and
(a)(7) contain the words “protected computers” giving the Secret
Service the power to investigate any computer fraud case in which
the perpetrator intentionally, and with the intent to defraud,
accesses a protected computer, furthers an intended fraud, and
79
obtains anything of value. This is only true if the fraud affects
interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United
80
States.
The Secret Service would also have the power to
investigate any computer cracking scheme that affects interstate
and foreign commerce or communications of the United States as
long as the minimum requirements of sub-subsection (a)(5)(B) are
81
met.
82
The USA PATRIOT Act also strengthened the punishment
73. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(B)(i), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 814(a)(4),
115 Stat. 272, 383.
74. Id. at (e)(2), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 814(d)(1), 115 Stat. 272,
384.
75. Id. at (e)(2)(A).
76. Id. at (e)(2)(B), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 814(d)(1), 115 Stat. 272,
384.
77. Id.
78. See id. at (d). The United States Secret Service, and other agencies, have
the authority to investigate any offenses under sub-subsections (a)(2)(A),
(a)(2)(B), (a)(3), (a)(4), and (a)(6). Id.
79. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4).
80. See id.
81. See id. at (a)(5).
82. This table illustrates the statutory punishment for violations of specific
sub-subsections before and after the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act. Its
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purpose is to facilitate a clear understanding of the analysis in the subsequent
paragraphs of the text.
Punishment for Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030
CFAA
Section
and
Subsection Reference to
Targeted Offense

CFAA Section and
Subsection
that
Provides
for

18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)

1 Offense—
18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(c)(1)(A)

Pre-USA PATRIOT Act
Punishment for Violation

Post-USA
PATRIOT
Act Punishment for
Violation

Punishment
st

1 Offense—fine and/or
imprisonment
for
not
more than 10 years

nd

2 Offense—fine and/or
imprisonment
for
not
more than 20 years

1 Offense—

st

1

18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(c)(2)(A)-(B)
nd
2 Offense—

imprisonment
for
not
more than 1 year or 5
years depending on how

18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(c)(2)(C)

or why the crime was
committed
nd
2 Offense—fine and/or

2 Offense—
18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(c)(1)(B)
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)

st

nd

st

Offense—fine and/or

imprisonment
for
more than 10 years
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(3)

18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4)

st

st

1 Offense—fine and/or
imprisonment
for
not

§ 1030(c)(2)(A)
nd
2 Offense—
18 U.S.C.

more than 1 year
nd
2 Offense—fine and/or
imprisonment
for
not

§ 1030(c)(2)(C)

more than 10 years

st

1 Offense—fine and/or
imprisonment
for
not
more than 5 years

nd

2 Offense—fine and/or
imprisonment
for
not
more than 10 years

2 Offense—
18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(c)(3)(B)
st

Same

not

1 Offense—
18 U.S.C.

1 Offense—
18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(c)(3)(A)

Same

st

Same

Same

nd

st

18 U.S.C. §

1 Offense—

1

1030(a)(5)(A)(i)

18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(c)(4)(A)
nd
2 Offense—

and/or imprisonment
for not more than 10
years

18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(c)(4)(C)

2
Offense—fine
and/or imprisonment
for not more than 20

Offense—fine

nd

years
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83

for violation or attempted violation of subsection (a). The Act
“directs the U.S. Sentencing Commission to amend the U.S.S.G. to
ensure that individuals convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1030 ‘can be
subjected to appropriate penalties, without regard to any
84
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment.’”
It also
strengthened the punishment in part by stating that the word
85
“conviction” includes any conviction under state law.
A person who violates sub-subsection (a)(1) can be fined

18 U.S.C. §
1030(a)(5)(A)(ii)

st

Offense—fine
1
and/or imprisonment
for not more than 5

nd

years
nd
2
Offense—fine
and/or imprisonment

st

1 Offense—
18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(c)(4)(B)
2 Offense—
18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(c)(4)(C)

for not more than 20
years
18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(a)(5)(A)(iii)

18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(6)

18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(7)

st

st

1 Offense—
18 U.S.C.

Offense—fine
1
and/or imprisonment

§ 1030(c)(2)(A)
nd
2 Offense—
18 U.S.C.

for not more than 1
year
nd
2
Offense—fine

§ 1030(c)(3)(B)

and/or imprisonment
for not more than 10
years

st

st

1 Offense—

1

18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(c)(2)(A)
nd
2 Offense—

imprisonment
for
not
more than 1 year
nd
2 Offense—fine and/or

18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(c)(2)(C)

imprisonment
for
more than 10 years

st

Offense—fine and/or

Same

not

st

1 Offense—
18 U.S.C.

1 Offense—fine and/or
imprisonment
for
not

§ 1030(c)(3)(A)
nd
2 Offense—
18 U.S.C.

more than 5 years
nd
2 Offense—fine and/or
imprisonment
for
not

§ 1030(c)(3)(B)

more than 10 years

Same

83. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(b). “Whoever attempts to commit an offense under
subsection (a) of this section shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of
this section.” Id.
84. Jacobson & Green, supra note 24, at 287 (quoting USA PATRIOT Act §
814(f), 115 Stat. 272, 384) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 994(p)).
85. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(10), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 814(d)(5), 115
Stat. 272, 384 (providing that the term “conviction” shall include “a conviction
under the law of any State for a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than
1 year, an element of which is unauthorized access, or exceeding authorized
access, to a computer.”).
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86

and/or imprisoned for up to ten years. On the second violation,
that person can be fined and/or imprisoned for up to twenty
87
years.
A person who violates sub-subsection (a)(2), (a)(3),
(a)(5)(A)(iii), or (a)(6) can be fined and/or imprisoned for up to
88
89
one year. For violation of sub-subsection (a)(2), punishment is
maximized at a fine and/or five years in prison if: (1) the offense
was committed for purposes of commercial advantage or private
90
financial gain; (2) the offense was committed in furtherance of
any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws
91
of the United States or of any state; or (3) the value of the
92
information obtained exceeds $5000. Maximum sentences under
sub-subsections (a)(2), (a)(3), and (a)(6) are set at ten years for
93
second-time offenders.
A person who violates sub-subsection (a)(4), (a)(5)(A)(iii), or
94
(a)(7) can be fined and/or imprisoned for up to five years. On
the second offense, punishment is a fine and/or imprisonment for
95
up to ten years. The USA PATRIOT Act adds to the CFAA that a
violation under sub-subsection (a)(5)(A)(i) will result in a fine
96
and/or imprisonment up to ten years.
A violation of subsubsection (a)(5)(A)(ii) results in a fine and/or imprisonment of
97
up to five years. For each of these offenses the punishment is
maximized at a fine and/or imprisonment for up to twenty years
98
for the second offense.
The next notable change to the CFAA is found in the added
99
definition of “loss.” The broad definition is important because a
86. Id. at (c)(1)(A).
87. Id. at (c)(1)(B).
88. Id. at (c)(2)(A).
89. Id. at (c)(2)(B). The punishment is also for an attempt to commit an
offense under subsection (c)(2)(A). Id.
90. Id. at (c)(2)(B)(i).
91. Id. at (c)(2)(B)(ii).
92. Id. at (c)(2)(B)(iii).
93. Id. at (c)(2)(C).
94. Id. at (c)(3)(A).
95. Id. at (c)(3)(B).
96. Id. at (c)(4)(A), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 814(c)(3), 115 Stat. 272,
383.
97. Id. at (c)(4)(B), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 814(c)(3), 115 Stat. 272,
383.
98. Id. at (c)(4)(C), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 814(c)(3), 115 Stat. 272,
383.
99. Id. at (e)(11), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 814(d)(5), 115 Stat. 272,
384 (defining “loss” as “any reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost of
responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the
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person who suffers “damage or loss” by any violation of subsubsections (a)(5)(B)(i)-(v) can bring a civil action against the
violator to obtain compensatory damages, injunctive relief, or other
100
equitable relief.
Damages for violation of sub-subsection
101
(a)(5)(B)(i) are limited to economic damages.
This should
encourage people who would normally not bring a claim against
the perpetrator to bring a claim. Likewise, it could lead to more
prosecutions for cyber-crime, thereby creating a deterrent for
future cyber-crime.
C. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act
102

The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”) is the
federal law that protects electronic communication users against
unauthorized interception, use, or disclosure of electronic
103
communications while in transit or in storage.
The ECPA’s
purpose is to update privacy protections and standards with the
104
changes in computer and telecommunications technologies.
Since its inception, additional technology updates have included
electronic mail (e-mail), the Internet, cellular phones (some with
105
wireless Internet connections), and paging devices.
1. 18 U.S.C § 2702
Section 2702 provides for voluntary disclosure by electronic
communication service providers of customer communications or
106
records. This section prohibits a service provider from divulging
107
the contents of a communication to any person.
The same
data, program, system, or information to its condition prior to the offense, and
any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because
of interruption of service”).
100. Id. at (g).
101. Id.
102. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100
Stat. 1848.
103. Seth Richard Lesser, Privacy Law in the Internet Era: New Developments and
Directions, 701 PRACTICING L. INST. 115, 152-53 (June 2002).
104. See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 20-23 (1986); Henry M. Cooper, The Electronic
Communications Privacy Act: Does the Answer to the Internet Information Privacy Problem
Lie in a Fifteen-Year-Old Federal Statute? A Detailed Analysis, 20 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1, 2 (Fall 2001).
105. Cooper, supra note 104, at 2.
106. 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2000).
107. Id. at (a)(1). An “electronic communication service” is defined as “any
service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or
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108

applies to remote computing service providers.
The USA
PATRIOT Act adds sub-subsection (a)(3) to section 2702. It states
generally that a provider of electronic communications service
109
cannot divulge information about a customer.
The section has a few exceptions for disclosure of
communications. For example, a provider may divulge the
110
contents of a communication to the intended recipient, to a
111
person who forwards it to its destination, or to a law enforcement
112
113
agency if the contents were inadvertently obtained and appear
114
to pertain to the commission of a crime.
The USA PATRIOT Act added that a provider could divulge
customer records to a law enforcement agency if the provider
reasonably believes that immediate danger of death or serious
115
bodily injury to any person requires disclosure.
The USA
PATRIOT Act also added that a provider can disclose customer
116
information: (1) with consent of the customer; (2) as necessary to
117
protect the provider; (3) to a governmental agency in the case of
118
an emergency involving death or serious bodily injury; or (4) to
119
any person other than a governmental agency.
This new section allows “communications providers to disclose
non-content information (such as the subscriber’s login
120
records).”
Before the Act, a communications provider was
electronic communications[.]”
18 U.S.C. § 2510(15).
An “electronic
communication” is defined as “any transfer of sign, signals, writing, images, sound,
data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio,
electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or
foreign commerce. . . .” Id. at (12).
108. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(2).
109. Id. at (a)(3), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 212(a)(1)(B), 115 Stat. 272,
284.
110. Id. at (b)(1).
111. Id. at (b)(4).
112. Id. at (b)(6).
113. Id. at (b)(6)(A)(i).
114. Id. at (b)(6)(A)(ii).
115. Id. at (b)(6)(C), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 212(a)(1)(D), 115 Stat.
272, 284.
116. Id. at (c)(2), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 212(a)(1)(E), 115 Stat. 272,
284.
117. Id. at (c)(3), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 212(a)(1)(E), 115 Stat. 272,
284.
118. Id. at (c)(4), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 212(a)(1)(E), 115 Stat. 272,
285.
119. Id. at (c)(5), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 212(a)(1)(E), 115 Stat. 272,
285.
120. CHARLES DOYLE, TERRORISM: SECTION BY SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE USA
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expressly permitted to release content information, but not non121
content information. Therefore, it permits the disclosure of less
122
protected information.
2. 18 U.S.C. § 2703
This section focuses on the required disclosure of customer
123
communications or records.
It requires electronic
communication providers to disclose to a governmental agency the
contents of electronic or wire communication that is in electronic
124
storage for 180 days or less.
The investigators must have a
125
warrant issued under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 requires that the “property”
126
to be obtained “be within the district” of the issuing court.
Moreover, the statute did not allow warrants for e-mail located in
127
other districts.
One way in which Attorney General Ashcroft supported his
objective of giving law enforcement leeway in eliminating terrorist
organizations was to provide a single order that would apply to all
electronic communication providers:
[o]ur proposal would allow a federal court to issue a
single order that would apply to all providers in the
communications chain, including those outside the
region where the court is located. We need speed in
identifying and tracking down terrorists. Time is of the
essence. The ability of law enforcement to trace
communications into jurisdictions without obtaining an
additional court order can be the128difference between life
and death for American citizens.
To further this purpose, the USA PATRIOT Act amended
subsection (a) to require a warrant “by a court with jurisdiction
over the offense under investigation or an equivalent state
PATRIOT ACT § 212 (2001), available at
http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/011210crs.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2002)
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 107-236m pt. 1, at 58 (2001)) [hereinafter “TERRORISM”].
121. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 107-236m pt. 1, at 58 (2001)).
122. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 107-236m pt. 1, at 58 (2001)).
123. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2000).
124. Id. at (a).
125. Id.
126. FED . R. CRIM. P. 41(a) advisory committee’s note to 1990 amendment.
127. CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, supra note 26, at 7 n.14 (quoting DoJ, supra
note 33, at 55).
128. United States Department of Justice, supra note 35.
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129

warrant.”
As a result, the amendment “eliminates the
jurisdictional restrictions on access to the content of stored e-mail
130
pursuant to a court order.”
Before the amendment, “only a
federal court in the district in which the e-mail was stored could
131
issue the order.”
Now, however, “federal courts in the district
where an offense under investigation occurred may issue orders
132
applicable ‘without geographic limitation’. . . .”
This does not
promote warrant-friendly judge shopping because the issuing court
133
must have jurisdiction based on where the crime occurred.
An example of a jurisdictional problem that might arise is
“when an investigator in Boston is seeking electronic mail in the
Yahoo! account of a suspected terrorist, he may need to coordinate
with agents, prosecutors, and judges in the Northern District of
California, none of whom have any other involvement in the
134
investigation.” In cases involving kidnappings, or an immediate
threat to public safety, this hinders law enforcement’s ability to act
135
quickly.
Subsection (a), therefore, furthers public safety by
authorizing “courts with jurisdiction over investigations to compel
evidence directly, without requiring the intervention of their
counterparts in other districts where major Internet service
136
providers are located.” This is necessary because of the ease of
moving about the country and the ease of accessing the Internet.
For example, cellular telephones can be purchased with the option
137
of an Internet connection.
Next, section 2703 states that a provider must disclose the
contents of an electronic or wire communication, without notice to
the customer, if the governmental agency obtains a proper
138
warrant.
A provider must also disclose information when the

129. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2000), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 220(a)(1),
115 Stat. 272, 291-92.
130. CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, supra note 26, at 6.
131. Id. at 7.
132. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2703).
133. DoJ, supra note 33, at 37 (statement of Michael Chertoff, Assistant
Attorney General in the Justice Department for the Criminal Division).
134. Id. at 55.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See Nokia Expands Internet Traffic Management Offerings and Lowers Cost of
Entry with High-Performance Solutions, at
http://press.nokia.com/PR/200210/879416_5.html (Oct. 30, 2002).
138. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(A).
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139

governmental agency uses an administrative subpoena or a court
140
order.
Once again, in support of his objective to catch terrorists,
Attorney General Ashcroft stated:
[t]errorists are trained to change cell phones frequently,
to route email through different Internet computers in
order to defeat surveillance. Our proposal creates a more
efficient technology neutral standard for intelligence
gathering, ensuring that law enforcement’s ability to trace
the communications of terrorists over cell phones,
computer networks and the new technologies that may be
developed in the years ahead. These changes would
streamline intelligence-gathering procedures only. We do
not seek changes in the underlying protections in the law
for the privacy of law-abiding citizens. The information
captured by the proposed technology-neutral standard
would be limited to the kind of information you might
find in a phone bill, such as the phone numbers dialed by
a particular telephone.
The content of these
communications in this setting would remain off-limits to
monitoring by intelligence authorities, except under the
current legal standards where
content is available under
141
the law which we now use.
According to amendments made by the USA PATRIOT Act,
government agencies can gain information such as the subscriber’s
142
143
144
145
name, address, telephone number, service information,
146
subscriber number, and source of payment (including any credit
147
card or bank account number).
The agency needs only an
148
administrative subpoena to gather such information.
139. Id. at (b)(1)(B)(i).
140. Id. at (b)(1)(B)(ii).
141. United States Department of Justice, supra note 35.
142. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (c)(2)(A), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 210(1), 115
Stat. 272, 283.
143. Id. at (c)(2)(B), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 210(1), 115 Stat. 272,
283.
144. Id. at (c)(2)(C), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 210(1), 115 Stat. 272,
283.
145. Id. at (c)(2)(D), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 210(1), 115 Stat. 272,
283.
146. Id. at (c)(2)(E), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 210(1), 115 Stat. 272,
283.
147. Id. at (c)(2)(F), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 210(1), 115 Stat. 272,
283.
148. Id. at (c)(2).
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Before the USA PATRIOT Act amendment, investigators could
not obtain such records as credit card or bank account numbers,
149
even with a subpoena. This was a problem because “[i]n many
cases, users register with Internet service providers using false
names, making the form of payment critical to determining the
150
user’s true identity . . . .”
In fast-moving investigations,
identifying the conspirators through Internet communications is
151
critical.
Billing and other information can identify both the
perpetrators and their conspirators and give valuable information
152
about financial accounts.
3. 18 U.S.C. § 2511
153

Under section 2511, any person who intentionally intercepts
154
any wire, oral, or electronic communication can be imprisoned
155
156
or fined. A person cannot intentionally use or disclose to any
other person the contents of any communication obtained through
157
prohibited interception techniques.
The ECPA permits an officer, acting in the normal course of
his employment, to intercept an electronic communication and to
disclose or use the information obtained from the
158
communication. The law also permits an officer to intercept an
electronic communication if one of the parties consented to the
159
interception. An officer, in the normal course of his official duty,
160
can conduct electronic surveillance.
149. See CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, supra note 26, at 6 n.13 (quoting DoJ, supra
note 33, at 55, § 107).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2000).
154. Id. at (1)(a).
155. Id. at (4)(a).
156. Id. at (1)(d).
157. Id. at (1)(c).
158. Id. at (2)(b).
159. Id. at (2)(c).
160. Id. at (2)(e). “Electronic surveillance” means:
(1) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance
device of the contents of any wire or radio communication sent by or
intended to be received by a particular, known United States person
who is in the United States, if the contents are acquired by
intentionally targeting that United States person, under circumstances
in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a
warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes;
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The USA PATRIOT Act amended this section to make it lawful
161
for an officer to intercept a computer trespasser’s wire or
electronic communication transmitted to or through a protected
162
computer.
The officer is permitted to intercept the
communication if: (1) the owner of the protected computer
163
authorized the interception; (2) the officer is lawfully engaged in
164
an investigation; (3) the officer has a reasonable belief that the
165
communication will be relevant to the investigation; and (4) the
interception does not acquire communications other than those
166
transmitted to or from the computer trespasser.
The purpose of this amendment is to give the victims of

(2) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance
device of the contents of any wire communication to or from a person
in the United States, without the consent of any party thereto, if such
acquisition occurs in the United States, but does not include the
acquisition of those communications of computer trespassers that
would be permissible under section 2511(2)(i) of Title 18;
(3) the intentional acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other
surveillance device of the contents of any radio communication, under
circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement
purposes, and if both the sender and all intended recipients are
located within the United States; or
(4) the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other
surveillance device in the United States for monitoring to acquire
information, other than from a wire or radio communication, under
circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement
purposes.
50 U.S.C. § 1801(f).
161. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(21), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 217(1)(C), 115
Stat. 272, 291 (defining “computer trespasser” as “a person who accesses a
protected computer without authorization and thus has no reasonable expectation
of privacy in any communication transmitted to, through, or from the protected
computer” but does not include “a person known by the owner or operator of the
protected computer to have an existing contractual relationship with the owner or
operator of the protected computer for access to all or part of the protected
computer”).
162. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(i), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 217(2), 115 Stat.
272, 291.
163. Id. at (2)(i)(I), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 217(2), 115 Stat. 272, 291.
164. Id. at (2)(i)(II), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 217(2), 115 Stat. 272,
291.
165. Id. at (2)(i)(III), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 217(2), 115 Stat. 272,
291.
166. Id. at (2)(i)(IV), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 217(2), 115 Stat. 272,
291.
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computer trespassers the right to authorize law enforcement to
167
intercept the trespassers’ communication.
Cyber-attacks “cost
companies and citizens millions of dollars and endanger public
168
safety.” For example, when a cracker attacks a computer system
to disable it, the attack can shut down businesses, emergency
169
responders, or security centers. The attack can cause the target’s
server “to run out of memory and become incapable of responding
170
to the queries of legitimate customers or users.”
This creates
problems and the victims of such attacks should be able to call
upon law enforcement agencies to help them.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 2517
This section provides for the authorization, disclosure, and use
171
of intercepted wire, oral, or electronic communication.
Specifically, it permits any officer who has lawfully obtained
knowledge of the contents of any communication to disclose the
contents to another officer to the extent that the disclosure is
172
appropriate to the official duties of each officer. Furthermore,
these officers may disclose the information while giving testimony
173
under oath or affirmation in any proceeding.
If an officer
intercepts any communication relating to an offense that is not
specified in the order of approval, the contents of the
communication and the evidence derived from it may be disclosed
174
or used.
The officer may also disclose such information in
testimony if a judge declares that the contents were otherwise
175
properly intercepted.
The USA PATRIOT Act authorizes an officer to share any
information gathered about foreign intelligence with the
176
appropriate
federal
agency.
Therefore,
177
“the left hand has to know what the right hand is doing.” Before
167. TERRORISM, supra note 120, at § 217.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. 18 U.S.C. § 2517 (2000).
172. Id. at (1).
173. Id. at (3).
174. Id. at (5).
175. Id.
176. Id. at (6), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 203(b)(1), 115 Stat. 272, 280.
177. DoJ, supra note 33, at 17 (statement of Larry D. Thompson, Deputy
Attorney General of the United States).
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the amendment, courts had interpreted the law so that there could
178
be no information sharing.
Enforcement agencies faced
situations in which the FBI had information, but the law prohibited
it from sharing the information with people who could arrest the
179
wrongdoers. Now, such information may be disclosed in cases of
180
official duties only.
Perhaps this is a step toward protecting
181
citizens against information leaks.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 3123
182

Section 3123 concerns the issuance of an order for a pen
183
184
register or a trap and trace device. Prior to amendment by the
USA PATRIOT Act, this section stated that a court shall enter an ex
parte order authorizing the installation and use of a pen register or
178. DoJ, supra note 33, at 35 (statement of Michael Chertoff, Assistant
Attorney General in the Justice Department for the Criminal Division).
179. Id.
180. 18 U.S.C. § 2517(6), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 203(b)(1), 115 Stat.
272, 280.
181. Abuse of information gathering and information sharing is of paramount
concern. Congressman Frank noted that “one of the problems we’ve seen
historically is the inappropriate release of information garnered by
surveillance . . . .” DoJ, supra note 33, at 27 (statement of Mass. Rep. Barney Frank,
Member, House Comm. on the Judiciary).
182. 18 U.S.C § 3123 (2000).
183. The USA PATRIOT Act also amended the definition of the term “pen
register.” As amended, “pen register” is defined as:
[A] device or process which records or decodes dialing, routing,
addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or
facility from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted,
provided, however, that such information shall not include the
contents of any communication, but such term does not include any
device or process used by a provider or customer of a wire or electronic
communication service for billing, or recording as an incident to
billing, for communications services provided by such provider or any
device or process used by a provider or customer or a wire
communication service for cost accounting or other like purposes in
the ordinary course of its business.
18 U.S.C. § 3127(3), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 216(c)(2), 115 Stat. 272, 290.
184. The USA PATRIOT Act also amended the definition of the term “trap
and trace device.” As amended, the term “trap and trace device” is defined as:
[A] device or process which captures the incoming electronic or other
impulses which identify the originating number or other dialing,
routing, addressing, and signaling information reasonably likely to
identify the source of a wire or electronic communication, provided,
however, that such information shall not include the contents of any
communication.
18 U.S.C. § 3127(4), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 216(c)(3), 115 Stat. 272, 290.
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a trap and trace device within the jurisdiction of the court if the
court finds that the obtainable information is relevant to an
185
ongoing criminal investigation.
The USA PATRIOT Act amends subsection (a) by changing
186
“within the jurisdiction of the court” to “anywhere within the
187
United States.” This gives nation wide effect to pen registers and
188
trap and trace devices.
This is important because prior to the
amendment, law enforcement officers tracking down criminals
189
wasted time and resources to obtain orders in each jurisdiction.
In other words, the amendment eliminates “the need to intrude
upon the resources of courts and prosecutors with no connection
190
to the investigation.”
The amendment adds that the court order applies to any wire
or electronic communication service provider in the United States
191
that can assist in the execution of the order.
This language
permits governmental agencies to trace Internet and computer
192
network communications through multiple service providers.
Moreover, when law enforcement serves an order on a person not
specifically named in the order, the acting attorney must provide
certification that the order applies to a person not listed on the
193
order but being served.
This means that law enforcement
officers can issue the order to any Internet service provider who
194
they believe has relevant information.
The USA PATRIOT Act also added sub-subsection (a)(3),
which demands that an agency that implements an order by using
its own pen register or trap and trace device on a packet-switched
data network of a provider of electronic communication service to
the public maintain a record identifying: (1) any officers who

185. 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a).
186. Id.
187. 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a)(1), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 216(b)(1), 115
Stat. 272, 288-89.
188. Lori A. Schechter & Sarah H. Phan, Privacy on the Internet: Statutory
Authority, Enforcement and Policy, 710 PRACTICING L. INST. 209, 222 (2002).
189. See CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, supra note 26, at 6 n.12 (quoting DoJ, supra
note 33, at 54, § 101).
190. TERRORISM, supra note 120, at § 216.
191. 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a)(1), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 216(b)(1), 115
Stat. 272, 288-89.
192. See Schecter & Phan, supra note 188, at 222.
193. 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a)(1), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 216(b)(1), 115
Stat. 272, 288-89.
194. See Osher, supra note 22, at 526.
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installed or accessed the device to obtain information from the
195
network; (2) the date and time the device was installed and
uninstalled, and the duration of each time the device was
196
accessed; (3) the configuration of the device at the time of
197
installation, plus any later modification; and (4) any information
198
that the device has collected.
This sub-subsection encourages
agencies to set the pen register or trap and trace device to record
199
data electronically.
The agency must provide the court that
200
entered the order with the record of the use of the device.
This amendment refers to a monitoring device, such as
201
Carnivore, that is installed on a public provider’s computer.
202
Carnivore is a software program that was created by the FBI. It
functions as a cyber-wiretap and is designed to capture network
203
traffic and save that traffic to a storage medium.
Carnivore
204
collects two kinds of data: addressing information and full
205
206
content
of communications.
This section of the ECPA
authorizes the use of the pen mode, which collects addressing
207
information associated with Internet activity. In pen mode, “the
195. 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a)(3)(A)(i), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 216(b)(1),
115 Stat. 272, 289.
196. Id. at (a)(3)(A)(ii), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 216(b)(1), 115 Stat.
272, 289.
197. Id. at (a)(3)(A)(iii), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 216(b)(1), 115 Stat.
272, 289.
198. Id. at (a)(3)(A)(iv), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 216(b)(1), 115 Stat.
272, 289.
199. Id. at (a)(3)(A), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 216(b)(1), 115 Stat. 272,
289.
200. Id. at (a)(3)(B), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 216(b)(1), 115 Stat. 272,
289.
201. See Schecter & Phan, supra note 188, at 222.
202. See McCarthy, supra note 9, at 828.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 834. Carnivore collects addressing information per 18 U.S.C. §§
3121-27. Id. Addressing information is collected in the “pen mode” which
suggests that “the FBI believes that obtaining addressing information is essentially
the same as obtaining phone numbers via a pen register.” Id. at 835.
205. Id. at 834. Carnivore collects full content per 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22. Id.
Full content information is collected in the “full mode” in which “the FBI can
obtain the actual content of real-time communications.” Id. at 835. The line
between content and non-content information was drawn by the United States
Supreme Court in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741-43 (1979).
206. See McCarthy, supra note 9, at 834; Geoffrey A. North, Note, Carnivore in
Cyberspace: Extending the Electronic Communications Privacy Act’s Framework to Carnivore
Surveillance, 28 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 155, 165 (2002).
207. See 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a)(3)(A), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 216(b)(1),
115 Stat. 272, 289.
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FBI can use Carnivore to obtain ‘the TO and FROM e-mail
addresses and the IP addresses of computers involved in File
Transfer Protocol (FTP) and Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
208
sessions.’”
Carnivore places the FBI and cyber-criminals on a
level playing field by giving the FBI similar investigative techniques
and procedures as those available to law enforcement in the
209
telephone context.
Before the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act, the order
issued was required to specify: (1) the identity of the person to
210
whom the telephone line is leased; (2) the identity of the person
211
who is the subject of the criminal investigation; (3) the number,
the physical location of the telephone line, and the geographic
212
limits of the order; and (4) the offense to which the information
213
relates.
This subsection promotes Attorney General Ashcroft’s goal of
stopping terrorists by updating the statutes to the current state of
technology:
Terrorist organizations have increasingly used technology
to facilitate their criminal acts and hide their
communications from law enforcement. Intelligencegathering laws that were written for an era of land-line
telephone communications are ill-adapted for use in
communications over multiple cell phones and computer
networks—communications that are also carried by
multiple telecommunications
providers located in
214
different jurisdictions.
As amended by the USA PATRIOT Act, this subsection
includes language that indicates modes of technology beyond
208. See McCarthy, supra note 9, at 835 (citing IIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL REVIEW OF THE CARNIVORE SYSTEM, DRAFT REPORT, at ix
(Nov. 17, 2000), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/publications/carnivore_draft_1.pdf.
209. Id. at 844; see North, supra note 206, at 166-68; but see Peter J. Georgiton,
The FBI’s Carnivore: How Federal Agents May Be Viewing Your Personal E-Mail and Why
There Is Nothing You Can Do About It, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1831, 1866 (noting that “[t]he
problems with Carnivore are clear: There are too many possibilities that Carnivore
will intercept more e-mail than necessary, too few protections imposed by federal
constitutional and statutory law, and an outright absence of sufficient judicial
supervision of the FBI”).
210. 18 U.S.C. § 3123(b)(1)(A).
211. Id. at (b)(1)(B).
212. Id. at (b)(1)(C).
213. Id. at (b)(1)(D).
214. United States Department of Justice, supra note 35.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss3/3

26

Schemmel: www.stopcybercrime.com: How the USA Patriot Act Combats Cyber-cri
S CHEMMEL ARTICLE CURRENT FORMATTED.DOC

2003]

THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND CYBER-CRIME

2/7/2003 2:33 PM

947

telephones. Examples of such language include “the telephone
215
line or other facility” and “the attributes of the communication to
which the order applies, including the number or other identifier
and, if known, the location of the telephone line or other facility to
which the pen register or trap and trace device is to be attached or
216
applied.” Such facilities include: “a cellular telephone number; a
specific cellular telephone identified by its electronic serial
number; an Internet user account or e-mail address; or an Internet
protocol address, port number, or similar computer network
217
address or range of addresses.”
6. 18 U.S.C. § 3121
Section 3121 provides an exception to the general prohibition
218
against pen register and trap and trace device use. Initially, the
section states that no person may install or use a pen register or
219
trap and trace device without first obtaining a court order. The
one exception to the general prohibition is in favor of providers of
220
electronic or wire communication. Such providers can use pen
221
registers or trap and trace devices when a user consents to the use
or when the use relates to the operation, maintenance, and testing
of a service or for the protection of the property or rights of the
222
provider. A provider can also use such a device to protect itself,
another provider, or a user of the service from fraudulent,
223
unlawful, or abusive use of service.
The next subsection limits a governmental agency which is
authorized to use a pen register to the use of technology that
restricts the recording or decoding of electronic or other impulses
to the dialing and signaling information utilized in the call
224
processing.
The USA PATRIOT Act, however, amended the
language of this subsection to include a trap and trace device along
215. 18 U.S.C. § 3123(b)(1)(A), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 216(b)(2),
115 Stat. 272, 289 (emphasis added).
216. Id. at (b)(1)(C), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 216(b)(2), 115 Stat. 272,
289 (emphasis added).
217. TERRORISM, supra note 120.
218. 18 U.S.C. § 3121 (2000).
219. Id. at (a).
220. Id. at (b).
221. Id. at (b)(3).
222. Id. at (b)(1).
223. Id. at (b)(2).
224. Id. at (c).
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with the use of a pen register and the use of technology that
records or decodes “dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling
information utilized in the processing and transmitting of wire or
electronic communication so as not to include the contents of any
225
wire or electronic communication.”
By adding the words “dialing” and “routing,” this amendment
permits a governmental agency to track e-mail and Internet
226
usage. However, it does not allow the collecting of e-mail subject
227
lines.
This amendment also permits the use of software like
228
Carnivore.
III. CONCLUSION
Computer crime presents new challenges to law enforcement
agencies. The most troublesome challenge is that the cyber-world
229
is much larger than any country’s borders. The next challenge is
that in computer crime cases officials cannot track a trail of
physical evidence as they would to find the burglar who burglarized
230
a home.
To give these officials the tools they need to stop cyber-crime,
231
the laws need to change as technology changes.
The USA
225. 18 U.S.C § 3121(c), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 216(a), 115 Stat. 272,
288.
226. See McCarthy, supra note 9, at 445 (2002); Schecter & Phan, supra note
188, at 222; Richard Willing, Anti-terror Bill Expands Government’s Reach, USA TODAY,
Oct. 25, 2001, at A7.
227. TERRORISM, supra note 120, at section 216.
228. See supra Part II.C.5 (discussing how Carnivore functions).
229. Shawn P. McCarthy, If You Want to Catch a Hacker, Hire One—Or be a
Sophisticated Fed, INTERNAUT, available at
http://gcn.com/archives/gcn/1998/june1/if_you_want_to_catch_a_hacker.htm
(June 1, 1998) (“[C]yberspace knows no boundaries.”).
230. Cybercrime Enforcement: Hearing on H.R. 3482 Before the Subcomm. On Crime,
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Susan Kelley
Koeppen, Corporate Attorney, Mircosoft Corp.):
In the online world, we often face a problem with criminal actions that
are not treated as crimes, and with criminals who do not do time.
While our society does not tolerate people breaking into brick-andmortar homes and businesses, we inexplicably seem to have more
tolerance for computer break-ins. Yet breaking into computers is just
as much a crime as breaking into homes and businesses. Both breakins harm innocent people and weaken American businesses, and
computer attacks need to be treated as the truly criminal activities that
they most assuredly are.
Id.
231. “We are not asking the law to expand; just to grow as technology grows.
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PATRIOT Act provides such tools by eliminating jurisdictional
boundaries of courts, permitting Internet service providers to share
information with law enforcement agencies, and providing for the
use of software like Carnivore. Once tracked down, criminals need
to face a deterring penalty for their actions. Cyber-crime needs to
be prevented because individuals, the government, and industry
use computers and the Internet to communicate and gather
information, to market goods, to solicit and consummate business
deals, and to store sensitive data.

This information has historically been available when criminals used pre-digital
technologies. This same information should be available to law enforcement
officials today.” United States Department of Justice, supra note 35. “[N]one of
[these provisions] is a revolution in the law. All of these are techniques and
principles that we have been applying for 20 or 30 years in some context. We are
simply trying to apply them across the board so we don’t have gaps in the
coverage.” DoJ, supra note 33, at 28 (statement of Michael Chertoff, Assistant
Attorney General in the Justice Department for the Criminal Division).
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